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Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Historical Institutionalism, and British and German Perceptions 
of the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to determine whether British and German sea fisheries policies have been 
shaped by domestic factors or by EU institutions. To achieve this aim, British and German perceptions 
of the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) were compared using two alternative theories of EU 
integration: Moravscik’s Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Pierson’s Historical Institutionalism. The 
perceptions of three sets of respondents – fisheries scientists; fishers; and politicians – were 
investigated in each country to determine whether they saw the CFP as a means of attaining their own 
nation’s domestic fisheries agenda (as Liberal Intergovernmentalism would argue), or as an 
institutional champion of European fisheries as a whole (as might be predicted by Historical 
Institutionalism). The article concludes that although there were elements of both theories evident in 
each country’s perceptions, British perceptions were more strongly indicative of Historical 
Institutionalism than Liberal Intergovernmentalism, and German perceptions were more strongly 
indicative of Liberal Intergovernmentalism than Historical Institutionalism. This difference is 
exemplified in Britain’s euroscepticism (which sees EU institutions as obstacles to British fisheries’ 
interests), and Germany’s environmentalism (which sees EU institutions as synchronising with 
Germany’s national priorities). 
 
Keywords: CFP, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Historical Institutionalism, euroscepticism, 
environmentalism.  
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The question of whether the fisheries policies of Member States of the EU are shaped by their own 
domestic agenda or by EU institutions, is important for an understanding of the relationship between 
the Member States and the CFP.  In one sense, that question can be answered very quickly: since all 
Member States are obliged to conform their fisheries policies to the CFP, those policies are inevitably 
shaped by EU institutions. But this is too simple an answer: a Member State may find its fisheries 
policies shaped by the EU against its will in directions that important groups within it find deeply 
objectionable. Conversely, a Member State may find the EU a very congenial means of pursuing its 
own self-interest because the EU’s priorities are similar to its priorities.  Such contrasting perceptions 
are the subject matter of this paper, exemplified in the different viewpoints of British and German 
respondents. These countries were chosen for comparison because while they shared some similarities 
(both had significant fisheries in the North Sea, and both were major players in the EU with equivalent 
incomes per capita), their perceptions of the CFP were driven by different agendas (euroscepticism in 
Britain and environmentalism in Germany), which entailed that they responded to EU institutions in 
different ways.  
 
This study is based on the perceptions of the CFP held by the three sets of major stakeholders – fishers; 
politicians; and fisheries scientists – in the two countries. The analysis is guided by two theories of the 
relationship between EU bodies and Member States – Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Historical 
Institutionalism.  The former theory interprets EU bodies as institutions that are managed by 
independent Member States adopting rational strategies to maximise their respective national interests. 
By contrast, the latter theory interprets EU bodies as institutions in which Member States are 
embedded, thereby foreclosing some of their options. The central focus in the study was to determine 
whether British and German stakeholders saw the CFP as a forum in which the national self-interest of 
their respective countries was promoted (as argued by Liberal Intergovernmentalism), or as an 
institutional constraint imposed to protect EU fisheries as a whole (as predicted by Historical 
Institutionalism).  While British stakeholders inclined to the latter, German stakeholders inclined to the 
former, reflecting their respective commitments to euroscepticism and environmentalism. 
 
Very little has been written in English about sea fisheries policy in Germany, still less in comparison to 
British sea fisheries policy. Yet such a comparison provides useful insights into the workings of both.  
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The British fishing industry is much larger than the German, employing about 12,000 fishers compared 
to about 4,000 in Germany. Commercial sea fishing in Britain is also geographically more widespread, 
in that it takes place all around the British Isles, whereas in Germany it is confined to its northern 
coastline. Germany joined the forerunner of the European Economic Community (EEC) at its inception 
in 1957 when it signed the Treaty of Rome, but Britain chose to remain outside until 1973 (illustrating 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism – pursuing what it saw as its own rational self-interest). As a result, 
Germany, unlike Britain, was able to influence the drafting of two regulations (70-2141 and 70-2142) 
in 1970 (the foundation stones of the future CFP), enshrining among other rules, the principle of equal 
access of Member States’ fishers to all Community waters [1]. These regulations were agreed by four 
of the six existing Member States (France, Germany, Holland and Belgium) in order to benefit from the 
fish stocks in areas controlled by the four states then applying for EEC membership – Britain, Ireland, 
Denmark and Norway. From the point of view of Germany, this was an example of Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism, in that it used EU institutions to improve its domestic self-interest, but from the 
point of view of Britain, it was an example of Historical Institutionalism, because when it joined the 
EEC in 1973, it was faced by an invasion of fishers from other Member States into its waters outside 
the 6/12 mile inshore limit. However, the CFP did not come into force until 1983, by which time 
Britain and Ireland had negotiated a ten-year derogation from the equal access principle by means of 
the principle of relative stability, which restricted access to vessels from states that had past track 
records of fishing in British and Irish waters (an example of Liberal Intergovernmentalism). This 
derogation was renewed in 1993 and 2003, and is still in place.   
 
There are many EU institutions involved in the CFP, prominent among them being the European 
Commission, which in the form of DG MARE proposes regulations and other policy changes 
(including annual quotas for fish stocks and their distribution to Member States) to the Council of 
Fisheries Ministers, which has the power of decision-making through qualified majority rule (so there 
is no national veto). Because the EU has designated fisheries as a reserved policy area, it has 
empowered the Commission to take action whenever it deems necessary to protect fish stocks or the 
marine environment. The European Parliament has a role in communicating matters of concern to the 
Commission and the Fisheries Council, but no power to make decisions. DG Environment also plays a 
role in the CFP, by advising the Commission on environmental impacts of fishing activity. The 
European Court of Justice is sometimes called upon by the Commission or Member States or NGOs or 
interest groups or even individual EU citizens to rule on contentious fisheries issues.
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  Summarising 
these EU institutions, the historical institutionalist elements in the Commission and the Court seem 
stronger than the liberal intergovernmental elements in the Fisheries Council and Parliament. 
Significantly, EU documents now refer to a “community sea” and “the community fishing fleet”.     
 
Since its inception in 1983, the CFP has been responsible for a raft of rules and regulations governing 
Member States’ fishing industries, including annual quotas (total allowable catches (TACs) which have 
steadily been cut for weakened stocks such as North Sea cod); effort controls such as days-at-sea limits 
and decommissioning schemes
2
; closed areas; minimum landing sizes (MLS); and gear restrictions. 
Although the Commission must obtain the approval of the Fisheries Council for these rules and 
regulations, and although the Commission allows Member States some leeway in how they implement 
them, nevertheless the CFP’s rules and regulations constitute a massive intervention in domestic 
fisheries policies. Moreover, in the 2003 reforms of the CFP, although the Commission set up seven 
                                                 
1
 For instance, in 1991 the Court overruled the British government’s Merchant Shipping Act (MSA) 
(1988), which outlawed the practice of ‘quota hopping’ (nationals in one Member State buying vessels 
registered in another Member State to obtain their quota) which Britain regarded as undermining the 
principle of relative stability [2]. In the so-called “Factortame” judgement, the Court ruled that the 
MSA was contrary to the Treaty of Rome’s principle of non-discrimination.  This was the first time 
that the Court had overruled a Member State’s Act of Parliament [3], and is an example of Historical 
Institutionalism.  
2
 For instance, between 1983 and 2001, the CFP imposed four Multi-Annual Guidance Programmes 
(MAGPs) to reduce the size of Member States’ fleets: ‘MAGPs aim to restructure Member States’ 
fishing fleets by setting reduction objectives with a view to bringing fishing effort more into line with 
available resources…the rationale behind MAGPs is that the available resources should determine the 
size of the fleet and not, as has often been the case, that the size of Total Allowable Catches be 
determined by the size of the fleet’ [4].    
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Regional Advisory Councils (RACs), including the North Sea RAC, which could be interpreted as 
giving a greater voice to Member States (though no extra power), it also imposed more environmental 
restrictions on Member States, and tightened monitoring and enforcement mechanisms (e.g. by satellite 
surveillance of vessels at sea). How far these interventions are interpreted by Member States as top-
down fait accompli issued by overweening EU institutions imposing the will of the EU (Historical 
Institutionalism), or as measures that Member States themselves endorsed as expressions of their own 
self-interest (Liberal Intergovernmentalism), is the central question of this paper. 
 
In the next section, the two theories of Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Historical Institutionalism are 
explained, along with the methodology used in the paper; in sections 3 and 4, the perceptions of British 
and German stakeholders respectively on the CFP are examined; section 6 provides a comparative 
analysis of these perceptions; and section 7 concludes the paper by summarising its implications. 
 
2.  Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Historical Institutionalism      
 
Two theories of EU integration were used to guide this analysis: Andrew Moravcsik’s theory of Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism, and Paul Pierson’s theory of Historical Institutionalism. Although both theories 
stress the importance of Member States in the integration process, the former argues that Member 
States remain the central focus of integration, whereas the latter argues that Member States can lose 
control of the integration process because of past bargains, path dependency, and institutional lock-in.   
 
2.1  Liberal Intergovernmentalism  
 
In Moravcsik’s theory, EU institutions are arenas for strategic bargaining between Member States that 
do not have their preferences determined exogenously by interaction with EU institutions, but 
endogenously by their own domestic politics. Their preferences are ‘a set of underlying national 
objectives independent of any particular international negotiation to expand exports, to enhance 
security vis-à-vis a particular threat, or to realise some ideational goal’ [5]. Such preferences, according 
to Moravcsik, are not influenced, still less formed, by EU institutions, but emerge from a complex 
system of group interaction at and below the level of the state (in the case of fisheries, this would 
involve national scientists, fishermen, politicians and other interested groups). Thus states can act as if 
they are unitary bodies at EU negotiations, even though there may be strong domestic competition 
between interested groups at home. This theory is state-centric, reflecting both a realist view of 
international relations, and a rational choice conception of decision-making as maximisation of 
individual self-interest. On this interpretation, EU institutions are created by Member States for some 
benefit to themselves, not created by supra-national entrepreneurs to forge a sense of commitment to 
the European project. In other words, EU institutions are perceived by Member States as their tools, not 
their masters: they are simply instruments fashioned by them to solve problems that cannot be solved at 
the level of the nation-state, not organisms with a life of their own that inexorably evolve into 
uncontrollable forces with the power to impose unexpected and unwelcome demands on Member 
States in the name of some EU ideal. Hence, Member States may find it in their interests to cede 
policymaking competence to EU institutions in areas that are uncontroversial (“low politics” for them 
domestically), but are unwilling to do this in policies of high political salience (that is, “high politics” 
for them domestically).   
 
2.2  Historical Institutionalism  
 
By contrast, in Pierson’s theory, Member States do not have a carte blanche to use EU institutions for 
mutual bargaining activities, since they are ineluctably embedded in those institutions, and because of 
the “stickiness” of institutions, and the “sunk costs” invested in them, they are constrained to do, or 
refrain from doing, many actions against their better judgement.  Hence, ‘when European integration is 
examined over time, the gaps in Member State control appear far more prominent than they do in 
intergovernmentalist accounts’ [6]. This is not necessarily to claim that Member States’ preferences are 
wholly determined by EU institutions, still less that they obtain their sense of identity from their 
subordination to EU institutions, but simply that Member States’ policies are significantly influenced 
and inhibited by their interaction with EU institutions: ‘new governments in Member States now find 
that the dead weight of previous institutional and policy decisions at the European level seriously limits 
their room for manoeuvre’ [7].  Pierson acknowledges the assumption of Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
that Member States are the most important actors in the EU, but he argues that this theory ignores the 
transformative role played by EU institutions. EU institutions are not merely passive tools of Member 
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States, but active agents in limiting their room for manoeuvre, and as more powers are ceded to EU 
institutions, Member States find it increasingly difficult to act on their own. Although EU institutions 
may have been established by Member State decisions which initially reflected their rational choices, 
they come to embody past decisions which may in time come to haunt Member States because of their 
unintended consequences. For example, a change in an EU policy or institution which has been pursued 
by a single or collection of Member States, may ultimately lead to ‘reform that fundamentally 
transform[s] their own positions (or those of their successors) in ways that are unanticipated and/or 
undesired’ [8]. Such path dependence is hard to prevent, because EU institutions can be sclerotic and 
resistant to change: ‘political institutions are often “sticky” – specifically designed to hinder the 
process of institutional and policy reform’ [9]. Although theoretically Member States could abolish EU 
institutions that were no longer meeting their needs, in practice they are virtually unable to do so, 
because the sunken costs are too great and the procedures for doing so are too onerous, requiring a 
Treaty revision which entails a unanimous decision in the Council of Ministers and ratification by all 
national parliaments or referenda: a process ‘now widely recognised to be extraordinarily difficult and 
unpredictable’ [10]. Likewise, the option of a Member State leaving the EU altogether is hollow: ‘the 
constantly increasing costs of exit in a densely integrated polity have rendered this option virtually 
unthinkable for EC Member States’ [11]. At some point in the past, a Member State might have ceded 
policymaking competence to the EU in an area originally considered to be of marginal importance (or 
“low politics”), but because of the processes outlined above, this policy area might have acquired 
significant political salience and become an area of “high politics”.  
 
In what follows, these two theories are applied as guides or lenses by which to filter the empirical data 
collected through interviews with stakeholders in Britain and Germany on their perceptions of the CFP. 
37 interviews were conducted during 2004 and 2005: the British stakeholders interviewed comprised 
six fishers, four politicians, and four scientists; and the German stakeholders interviewed comprised 
five fishers, six politicians, and twelve scientists. The questions asked in the semi-structured interviews 
were generally open-ended, focusing on both broad issues (such as ‘In your opinion, what are the 
critical issues on CFP management?’), and narrow issues (such as ‘how do you regard the following 
management measures: quota restrictions; effort control…?’). All interviewees were asked for 
permission to quote them by name in published literature, and all agreed, except one who wished any 
quotations from him to be anonymised.   
 
3.  Perceptions of British Stakeholders            
 
The British stakeholders interviewed were divided in their perceptions of the CFP.  All were critical of 
its failure to conserve fish stock levels in the North Sea (the geographical area focused on in this 
study), but for different reasons and with different remedies to suggest.  British fishers were the most 
critical, though they were sharply divided between the rank and file fishers on the one hand, who 
argued vehemently for withdrawal from the CFP, and some (but not all) of their representatives (“elite” 
fishers) on the other hand, who argued that withdrawal was politically unfeasible, and that 
accommodation with the CFP was the only practicable strategy. The rank and file fishers saw the CFP 
as deliberately aiming to destroy the British fishing industry by sharing its waters with other Member 
States. They directed their attack at the Fisheries Council, which before recent enlargements, 
comprised 15 states: ‘Why should the country which has 70-80% of northwest Europe’s fish stocks 
swimming in its waters continually be in a minority of 14 to 1? And the national government of that 
country is completely powerless to do anything about it. That’s the nuts and bolts of the CFP’ [12]. 
This grievance tapped into wider debates of sovereignty and even national identity: ‘the issue is 
between our national identity and survival, and the planned map of our industry’s eradication, 
supported by those [enemies] within’ [13]. Tom Hay (chairman of the Fishermen’s Association Ltd) 
referred to ‘the unprincipled attempt to conceal the disgraceful plans to get rid of the British fishing 
fleet, and make room for the other members of the European Union including Poland and the Baltic 
states, as “Brussels” expands its Empire, is the real reason for the catastrophic extermination of British 
fishermen…The only solution – which can be achieved – to this calculated oppression is the restoration 
of national control of our fishing grounds’ [italics in original] [14]. 
 
There was more consensus between rank and file and elite fishers on narrower issues such as fish stock 
levels, which most fishers regarded as healthier than did the scientists and politicians; the causes of 
decline in stocks, which most fishers saw as caused as much by environmental factors as by over-
fishing; the inadequacy of quota management, which fishers held was a distributive mechanism rather 
than a conservation measure; opposition to days-at-sea: the value of closed areas provided they were 
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temporary not permanent; acceptance of minimum landing sizes provided they were not too large; 
reluctant approval of satellite surveillance though ambivalence on observers; and recognition of 
Regional Advisory Councils (Barrie Deas, chief executive of the National Federation of Fishermen’s 
Organisations, affirmed that ‘I am a very strong supporter of the RACs…the government and the 
Commission are listening to the participants and giving plenty of support’ [15]), though there were 
mixed reactions to vessel decommissioning, gear restrictions and discard bans. Many British fishers 
criticised the CFP for being ‘too centralised’ [16] and ‘too cumbersome’ [17], and for having a ‘very 
top-down command and control philosophy, which is involved in the micro-management of the 
industry, and which has resulted in a regulatory framework that is neither effective nor understood’ 
[18]. It seems, therefore, that most British fishers were ideologically historical institutionalist in their 
orientation towards the CFP, in that they saw it as an external imposition of alien regulations which 
were obstacles to British self-interest, and although some of their leaders were more pragmatic, seeking 
ways of promoting the interests of the British fishing industry within the CFP, their stance reflected 
their greater exposure to the influence of EU institutions, which is itself a feature of historical 
institutionalism.       
 
British politicians were equally divided in their views on the CFP, reflecting the fact that fishery policy 
has been highly politicised in Britain. There was a sharp difference between politicians on the 
opposition side and politicians (and civil servants) on the government side: opposition politicians were 
far more critical of the CFP than were government politicians and bureaucrats, accusing it of failing to 
safeguard the interests of the British fishing industry.  Indeed, so polarised were these differences that 
in their 2005 general election manifesto, the main opposition party, the Conservatives, advocated 
British withdrawal from the CFP [19]
3
, as did the Scottish National Party (SNP),
4
 whereas both the 
Labour government and the Liberal Democrats argued against national control, but instead to work 
within the CFP to benefit British fishing interests.  The Labour government’s position was spelled out 
categorically by Ben Bradshaw, Fisheries Minister: ‘those who spend all their time calling for us to 
leave the CFP are marginalising themselves in the debate and abdicating the responsible leadership that 
the industry needs’ [21]. Echoing the comments of former Fisheries Commissioner Franz Fischler, 
Bradshaw argued that withdrawal from the CFP would mean UK withdrawal from the entire EU, and 
‘no government is going to take the UK out of the European Union’, and he claimed that the notion that 
there will be UK control is a ‘cruel deception’ [22]. The Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit report affirmed 
that ‘the evidence suggests that “national control” is not a solution to the problems facing the UK 
fishing industry’ [23].   
 
Most British politicians were critical of quota management because it led to high discard rates, and they 
preferred effort control, though the Conservatives favoured days-at-sea whereas the Labour 
government favoured decommissioning. The government also inclined towards individual transferable 
quotas, a system rejected by the SNP because of its potential threat to fisheries-dependent 
communities. There were mixed views on closed areas (the Conservatives were happier than was 
Labour) and gear restrictions (David Wilson, Director of Fisheries in the Scottish Executive, described 
them as ‘a key part of the fisheries’ management process’ [24], but Firth said that they ‘sound a 
wonderful idea, but it doesn’t work because here we are [in Shetland] with 150mm nets [but] alongside 
us comes a bloody industrial chap with you know mesh the size of girls’ tights’…mesh size sounds a 
good thing but you can always find your way around it’ [25]), though there was a general consensus in 
favour of satellite surveillance and against observers (because of their uncertain status and expense). 
On Regional Advisory Councils, Labour politicians were more supportive than were the Conservatives: 
indeed, Ben Bradshaw, British Fisheries Minister, said that ‘RACs could be the first step towards 
regional management of fisheries in Europe’ [26], whereas his opposite number, Owen Paterson, 
Conservative shadow fisheries minister, described them as ‘just a fig-leaf for keeping decision-making 
firmly in the hands of the Commission’, and advocated instead more notice taken of fishers’ knowledge 
in fish stock assessments [27].  It seems, therefore, that in Britain, opposition politicians took a more 
                                                 
3
 Michael Howard, the then Conservative leader, was unequivocal: ‘We intend to raise this in the 
Council of Ministers at the first opportunity and I believe we can achieve this through negotiation. 
However, should negotiations not succeed…the British Parliament is supreme and we would introduce 
the necessary legislation to bring about full national and local control’ [20]. 
4
 The interviews for this study were carried out before the Scottish National Party took over control of 
the Scottish Executive at Holyrood as a minority government in Scotland in 2007.  When in opposition, 
the SNP argued for withdrawal from the CFP; in office it argues that the CFP should be replaced when 
its current term ends in 2011.   
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historical institutionalist stance than did government politicians on the major issue of withdrawal from 
the CFP, by seeing the CFP as a major obstacle to British interests and rejecting compromise.  But even 
government politicians reflected historical institutionalism insofar as they resigned themselves to the 
fact of the CFP as an unalterable reality that they had to work with in the best way possible to 
safeguard what they could of the British fishing industry. 
 
British scientists were the least critical, and the most homogeneous, set of stakeholders, silently 
accepting the CFP as a fact of life, and arguing that although some of its regulations (like quota 
restrictions) did not work well in protecting stock levels, other instruments used by the CFP could be 
made to work in certain circumstances.  For instance, effort control was generally effective; closed 
areas were valuable in spawning grounds; discard bans might reduce discards, but risked creating a 
market for juveniles; minimum landing sizes were good for shellfish; and gear restrictions were 
potentially helpful in cutting discard rates but were easily circumvented. With regard to enforcement, 
British scientists thought highly of satellite surveillance (which could not be escaped), but not of 
observers (who could be intimidated).  Finally, the scientists welcomed the CFP reform measures, 
especially the proposal to give a greater role to fishers. As Professor Robin Cook (Chief Executive of 
Scotland’s premier fisheries research centre, Fisheries Research Services) put it, fishers ‘do have 
important knowledge and understanding of the resources that they are exploiting, which we need to try 
and incorporate into this decision-making process’ [28]. So although British scientists did not by any 
means regard the CFP as perfect, they did not express widespread animosity towards it, and they 
rejected the demand from some British fishers for withdrawal from the CFP – ‘fish don’t have a 
passport’ was the argument put forward by one British scientist.  It seems, therefore, that British 
scientists’ perceptions of the CFP reflected Historical Institutionalism more than they reflected Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism, though not in the extreme form exhibited by rank and file fishers and the main 
opposition politicians.       
 
4.  Perceptions of German Stakeholders 
 
The German stakeholders interviewed were generally less hostile to the CFP than were the British 
stakeholders.  Fishers were the most critical group: one criticism that they made was that the CFP did 
not take sufficient account of socio-economic factors.  A more radical charge was that the CFP was 
superfluous, because fish stocks were in danger more from environmental threats than over-fishing.  Dr 
Peter Breckling (chief executive of the German Fishermen’s Association) said that ‘the biggest factor 
in determining whether a stock increases or decreases in size is environmental conditions’ [29]. So 
‘fishermen cannot eradicate stocks; they eradicate themselves’ [30], and CFP measures like the North 
Sea Cod Recovery Plan were ‘doomed to fail’ [31]. However, these negative sentiments about the CFP 
did not indicate Historical Institutionalism as in Britain, because for the most part the CFP was 
conceived by German fishers not as an unwelcome constraint on German interests but as an 
unnecessary mechanism. The one exception to this generalisation was the view expressed by a small 
minority of German fishers in support of British fishers who demanded Britain’s withdrawal from the 
CFP: ‘Brussels talks nonsense…In Brussels the Greens are able to put their fantasies on paper and have 
them implemented at the expense of the fishing industry’ [32]. Here the CFP is seen as fundamentally 
antagonistic to the interests of the German fishing industry, but most German fishers disagreed with 
British withdrawal, and none was in favour of Germany leaving the CFP because the CFP was the 
guarantor of greater fishing opportunities for German fishers than they would enjoy outside it – the 
principle of relative stability guaranteed German fishers 300,000 tonnes of fish per annum. Another 
complaint from German fishers also reflected Liberal Intergovernmentalism – that fellow Member 
States failed to implement CFP regulations as rigorously as Germany did – a charge that was part of the 
competitive process of bargaining between states at the EU level.   
 
With regard to their views on specific CFP regulations, German fishers had mixed views on the quota 
system, but were united in their opposition to effort control, especially days-at-sea restrictions because 
‘fishermen will fish intensively on the days when they are allowed at sea’ [33], and if a skipper was 
running short on days, ‘he would be under pressure to do crazy and dangerous things for the crew and 
vessel’ [34]. On decommissioning, they were agreed that it had already been sufficiently carried out in 
Germany, to the point that German vessels could now only catch 52% of their quotas, and they 
complained that the CFP seemed unable to recognise that Germany had already cut its fleet drastically, 
and that it should not be subjected to more decommissioning because other Member States’ fleets were 
now much bigger threats to stock levels. There were mixed views on closed areas (support for real-
time, i.e. temporary, closures, but reservations about permanent closures because they ‘could have the 
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effect of transferring the effort into other areas, which would be fished twice as hard’ [35]; discard bans 
(while such bans would ‘force everybody to take responsibility for what they are doing’ [36], they 
could create a market for under-sized fish); minimum landing sizes; gear restrictions; and satellite 
surveillance (while Hartmann favoured it [37], Körs asked ‘why do they need to know where I am 
every 30 minutes?’ [38]), though there was a general feeling that the CFP contained too many 
regulations: ‘Do they want to prevent us from fishing or…ban us from fishing? All I want to do is 
fish!’ [39]. Most German fishers welcomed the Regional Advisory Councils. It seems, therefore, that 
German fishers held views on the CFP that were mainly redolent of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, but 
contained some elements of Historical Institutionalism in the stance adopted by a small minority of 
anti-green fishers.    
 
German politicians were less critical than fishers were of the CFP, mainly because unlike some fishers, 
they took the view that protection of the marine environment was a more important priority than the 
immediate interest of the fishing industry, and that the precautionary principle should prevail. 
Accordingly, politicians approved of CFP measures on closed areas (especially real-time closures), and 
gear restrictions (to reduce discards and protect benthic organisms). Indeed, in four respects the 
German parliament went further than the CFP in its green agenda,by urging the federal government to 
lobby within the EU: for ‘a ban on discards – everything caught must be landed and deducted from 
quota, which will assist scientific data’; for ‘a world-wide ban on demersal trawling [dredging the sea 
bed] in international waters’; for ‘an intensification of controls on fisheries, of which satellite 
monitoring could play an important role; and the introduction of an EU-wide coordinated sanctions 
regime’; and for ‘the creation of a global marine protection zone’ [40]. Moreover, collaboration 
between the Social Democrats and the Greens led to the following joint proposal: ‘The German 
Parliament calls upon the federal government to lobby within the EU for: the implementation of 
ecosystem management into fishery management; catching quotas to be based on the precautionary 
principle and sound scientific advice’ [41]. Furthermore, although opposition politicians were not as 
happy as government politicians were with the situation of the fishing industry, they generally blamed 
the federal government rather than the CFP for its ills.  For instance, the Christian Democrats/Socialists 
claimed that ‘Minister Künast must urgently rethink her questionable fisheries’ policy so that German 
fishermen will once more have a chance…Künast has surrendered the German fishing industry…she 
has revealed the basis for her policy under the slogan “sustainability”’ [42]. And no German politician 
interviewed felt that the CFP threatened the state’s national sovereignty. However, not all German 
politicians approved of all the CFP’s measures: on the contrary, most of them rejected CFP 
requirements for further decommissioning, while some of them objected to days-at-sea restrictions; 
expressed practical reservations about discard bans in mixed fisheries with vessels which had small 
holds; and voiced concern about the expense of satellite surveillance equipment for smaller vessels. It 
seems, therefore, that most German politicians embraced the environmental spirit of the CFP, seeing it 
as congruent with their own priorities, and even urging it to go further down the environmental road 
(Liberal Intergovernmentalism), though they did object to some CFP measures which they felt unfairly 
treated the German fishing industry (Historical Institutionalism). 
 
German scientists were the interviewees who were most favourably disposed towards the CFP as the 
only effective means of enforcing the necessary restrictions on fishing by Member States. Dr Peter 
Cornus (German representative on the Advisory Committee on Fisheries Management of the 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea) claimed that ‘Stocks can only be saved by 
regional management…the North Sea can only be managed by a coordinated and joint system such as 
the CFP’ [43]. Similarly, Professor Gerd Hubold (Head of the Institute of Sea Fisheries at Hamburg) 
argued that individual Member States could not effectively manage the North Sea fishery, and that 
wherever possible, EU solutions should be sought to the problems of EU fisheries [44].  This is not to 
say that German scientists thought that the current CFP was managing all the stocks well.  On the 
contrary, Hubold said that although ‘the assumption that all stocks are in poor shape is not correct…the 
reason why stocks are at their present level is because of poor management and, as a result of that, 
overfishing [45]’. According to Cornus, ‘The CFP may have failed in its objectives, but it could work 
were one to take the politics out of the system’ [46]. Professor Dietrich Schnack (Kiel University) 
argued that ‘quotas are a poor means of managing EU fisheries’ [47], and Hubold claimed that quota 
regulations were designed less to conserve fish than to distribute fishing opportunities [48]. Effort 
controls were more effective, especially by decommissioning measures, and more closed areas should 
be designated, despite political opposition.  Also a more stringent control system was needed, with 
more power given to the monitoring process at Vigo. On the discard ban proposal, German scientists 
argued in favour of more measures taken centrally at the EU level to prevent the problem of discards, 
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rather than hollowing out the CFP by devolving powers back to Member States. In other words, for 
German scientists, the centralisation of the CFP was unproblematic. They acknowledged the value of 
Regional Advisory Councils in bringing stakeholder groups together to discuss issues and give advice 
and make recommendations, but welcomed the fact that decision-making competence remained with 
the Commission and the Fisheries Council. All this suggests that German scientists held a Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist perspective, in that the CFP synchronised with their ecological priorities. 
 
5.  Comparative Analysis of British and German Stakeholder Perceptions of the CFP 
 
The above findings reveal significant contrasts and similarities of perceptions of the CFP between 
British and German stakeholders. The most important contrast is between rank and file British fishers 
together with a small number of German fishers on the one hand, versus elite British fishers together 
with most German fishers on the other hand.  The first group was hostile to the CFP, seeing it as the 
source of discriminatory treatment against it: rank and file British fishers claimed the EU wanted to 
reduce the British fishing fleet in the North Sea even further below its Exclusive Economic Zone 
entitlement to make room for vessels from other Member States, such as Spain and Poland; while some 
dissident German fishers claimed that the CFP’s green agenda prioritised the environment over the 
fishing industry. The second group was more favourable to the CFP, seeing it as necessary to safeguard 
fish stocks in the North Sea: elite British fishers regarded it as a regrettable fact of life or necessary evil 
to be worked within and around (the sunk costs were too great for withdrawal to be a feasible option); 
while most German fishers regarded it as a necessary good which secured them a much more generous 
share of North Sea fish than its Exclusive Economic Zone would yield. This contrast is partly explained 
by the fact that elite British fishers regularly come into contact with EU institutions (through 
membership of the North Sea Regional Advisory Council, and lobbying at the Fisheries Council), and 
that interactive experience rubbed off some of their instinctive suspicion of the CFP by a process of 
institutional socialisation or “blurring”, whereas rank and file British fishers never encountered EU 
institutions, and for them unfamiliarity bred contempt.   
 
The contrast is also explained by the fact that rank and file British fishers associated the CFP with 
negative images of the EU (euroscepticism), seeing the dead hand of Brussels preventing them from 
framing their own fisheries policy (Historical Institutionalism); whereas most German fishers 
associated the CFP with positive images of the EU (environmentalism), seeing Brussels as securing 
more fishing opportunities for them (Liberal Intergovernmentalism). So debates on the CFP among 
British fishers were linked to national sovereignty, which made fishing a heavily politicised issue, 
whereas debates on the CFP among German fishers were linked to the precautionary principle and 
ecosystem-based management, which made fishing an essentially technical and non-controversial 
policy area. The Factortame judgement delivered by the ECJ in 1991 had fanned the flames of British 
europhobia by confirming that the EU institutions could strike down British law and reduce the 
parliament at Westminster to a mere talking shop, thereby undermining the sovereignty of the British 
state.  No such reaction to Factortame occurred in Germany, because the Germans had long since 
accepted EU jurisdiction in fishery policy.         
 
Comparing the perceptions of British and German politicians also demonstrates this contrast.  On the 
one hand, opposition British politicians in the Conservative Party and the Scottish National Party 
expressed extreme hostility to the CFP to the point of advocating withdrawal; whereas government 
politicians in Britain, together with both opposition and government politicians in Germany, accepted 
the CFP (albeit with varying degrees of enthusiasm) as an inevitable fact of life, in the regulation of EU 
fisheries, and rejected calls for withdrawal as fantasy. Again this contrast is partly explained by a 
distinction between those politicians who do not, and those who do, attend EU meetings such as the 
Fisheries Council, and therefore are not, or are, institutionally socialised into the EU viewpoint. The 
contrast is also partly explained by differences in traditional attitudes to the EU: the traditional British 
attitude contains a strong element of popular euroscepticism, which politicians with no government 
responsibilities find easy to exploit
5
; whereas the traditional German attitude contains a strong belief in 
                                                 
5
 As Lequesne notes, for example, ‘in the UK, it is no accident that political parties and movements 
opposed to the EU, such as the Referendum Party, made quota hopping a spearhead of their “crusade” 
against Brussels in the 1990s’ [49]. 
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the EU’s holistic aspiration to find collective solutions to common problems – as Ortel6 put it: ‘the 
oceans belong to us all…and we must work as Europeans to resolve fisheries problems; that includes 
England’ [50]. The idea of the North Sea as a common resource of the EU was harder for British 
politicians than for German politicians to accept.   
 
A different picture emerges when comparing British and German fisheries scientists, for there is hardly 
any difference between their perceptions of the CFP.  Both British and German scientists held that 
over-fishing was the main cause of declining fish stocks, though environmental factors played a part, 
and that the CFP was necessary to control fishing activity, because fish “do not have passports”. Also, 
they both preferred effort control measures to quota restrictions.  The only significant difference 
between them was over the mode of management exhibited by the CFP: British scientists were more 
critical than were German scientists of the CFP’s top-down style of decision-making.  The general 
consensus between British and German scientists can be explained by their institutional socialisation 
during meetings at the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, which organises the annual 
collection and analysis of fisheries data to enable it to inform the EU on the state of the stocks, and give 
advice on the total allowable catches to be fixed for the next year.  This organisation has no research 
scientists of its own – it receives data from fisheries research institutes in Member States (and in four 
states that are not EU members – Iceland, Norway, Russia and the USA), and it relies on national states 
to provide scientists to attend its meetings to carry out the data assessment analysis. There are both 
Liberal Intergovernmentalist and Historical Institutionalist elements in the work of ICES.  The former 
elements lie in its reliance on nation states’ research institutes and scientists, and its inter-governmental 
character (it is a voluntary body; its Member States have chosen to cooperate in the task of stock 
assessments – they are not locked into submission to an EU supra-national scientific supremo). The 
latter elements lie in ICES’s socialisation powers: it alters the mindset and behaviour of scientists when 
they are exposed to the influence of scientists from other countries in an endeavour to reach consensual 
conclusions over stock levels and quota advice that may be different from the understandings of their 
own countries [51]. Of course, ICES is not an EU institution, so strictly speaking it cannot be 
designated as an EU institution which reduces the room for manoeuvre of Member States.  However, 
no EU Member State with a fishing industry could afford not to be a member of ICES, and ICES 
provides advice to the EU via the Commission’s advisory committee – the Scientific, Technical and 
Economic Committee on Fisheries [52], and has a major impact on CFP measures (both DG MARE 
and the Fisheries Council feel increasingly constrained to adopt most of ICES’s recommendations). 
Accordingly, ICES exerts considerable influence over Member States through its work with the EU, 
and therefore it can be regarded as a quasi-Historical Institutionalist force.        
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
While each of the two hypotheses of Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Historical Institutionalism 
explains some features of both British and German perceptions on the CFP, British perceptions are 
more inclined towards Historical Institutionalism, whereas German perceptions are more inclined 
towards Liberal Intergovernmentalism. The reasons for this divergence are two-fold: first, the fishing 
sector is more important to Britain than it is to Germany; second, environmentalism is more important 
to Germany than it is to Britain.  On the first reason, fishing has long been part of British identity but 
not of German identity.  This is partly because the fishing industry is three times larger in Britain than 
it is in Germany; partly because Britain is an island with sea fishing taking place throughout its national 
boundaries whereas it is confined to a fraction of Germany’s boundaries (only five of the sixteen 
Länder have a coastal frontier, and two of these regions are the city-states of Hamburg and Bremen/ 
Bremerhaven); and partly because in Britain fishing resonates in debates about its sea-faring past (‘this 
feeling that we are a seafaring nation and it does have the sort of iconic status…[fishermen] are seen to 
be sort of brave, worthy people carrying out a thoroughly worthwhile occupation’ [53]); its national 
sovereignty, and its place in Europe (‘high politics’). Indeed, so important was fishing to Britain that it 
waged four so-called ‘cod wars’ against Iceland during the 1950s and 1970s in an (ultimately vain) 
attempt to maintain its access to the lucrative fishing grounds in the North Atlantic in the face of 
successive Icelandic declarations of increasingly large economic exclusion zones [54]. By contrast, in 
Germany fishing does not have such a deep positive national resonance – it is simply another ‘low 
politics’ policy sector that has been ceded to the EU: ‘fishermen think they have the right to fish 
                                                 
6
 Holger Ortel (MDB) is chair of the Lower-Saxony parliamentary fraction of the Social Democratic 
Party and is a member of the parliamentary committee for Consumer Protection, Nutrition, and 
Agriculture, which has fisheries policy as one of its remits. 
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wherever they want, whereas the majority of society believes that fishermen are just like any other user 
of the sea’ [55]. It is true that fishing is important in some coastal communities in Germany – indeed, 
‘fishing represents a traditional and integral part of the economy and culture of the coastal Länder of 
Germany’ [56]. But unlike in Britain, its importance does not extend to the national stage: ‘it is a small 
policy sector’ [57], and ‘it is not a big topic’ [58]. As a result, Britain is much more determined than is 
Germany to cede to EU institutions as little control over its ‘own’ fisheries as possible.   
 
On the second reason, Germany has long embraced environmentalist values, pioneering principles such 
as the precautionary principle and ecological modernisation, and is therefore much more sympathetic 
than is Britain, who has often been labelled an environmental laggard in the EU, to the increasing 
environmental emphasis adopted by the CFP during the last ten years. The efforts of environmental 
NGOs such as Greenpeace in exposing the environmental damage inflicted by fishing activity have 
therefore been received much more enthusiastically in Germany than in Britain. As Captain Hartmann 
explained, ‘the emotional interest in fishing in Germany [has been] mainly Green-based over many 
years’ [59].  Indeed, there is now a negative green resonance attached to fishing in the public mind in 
Germany: ‘The fishery is very small but it is a highly emotional topic. For the Green Party and 
Greenpeace it is a symbol of the rubber-boat man risking his life before the big black factory trawler’ 
[60]. Accordingly, despite some reservations about the way the CFP treats the German fishing industry, 
on the whole Germany is happy to leave fisheries regulation in the hands of such an environmentally-
driven institution.    
 
What of the future?  Will Liberal Intergovernmentalism or Historical Institutionalism be more 
influential in Member States’ perceptions of the CFP later in the twenty-first century?  This question is 
difficult to answer because of competing currents in CFP policy. On the one hand, the CFP is 
increasingly espousing the notion of stakeholder participation and the devolution of decision-making to 
the lowest practicable level, implying that it envisages trusting Member States with more 
responsibilities over their fisheries – i.e. leaning towards Liberal Intergovernmentalism. On the other 
hand, the CFP is also increasingly espousing the need for stronger centralised enforcement of further 
environmental restrictions on fisheries activities – i.e. leaning towards Historical Institutionalism.  
Perhaps the only way to reconcile these apparently conflicting currents is for Member States such as 
Britain to embrace environmental stewardship with sufficient enthusiasm to persuade the CFP to 
devolve more decision-making powers to them without prejudice to its green agenda. 
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